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Constitutional Law-Due Process-ALL BuT MINIMAL PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS SAFEGUARDS HELD INAPPLICABLE AT IN-PRISON DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS--Wolff V. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974).
Inmates in penal institutions have historically been afforded less than
the full panoply of procedural rights which the federal courts have guaran-
teed in criminal proceedings.1 The traditional attitude that constitutional
rights' were left outside the prison gate3 eventually gave way to a recogni-
tion that some fundamental substantive due process rights are retained by
prisoners.' Because of an unwillingness to risk possible impairment of secu-
rity and order by overburdening officials with procedural matters, the
judiciary fashioned a "hands-off" doctrine as to procedural due process
rights.5 This doctrine precluded judicial review of prison disciplinary ac-
tion absent a showing that the action violated the eighth amendment
1. For a discussion of some of these rights, see Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimen-
sions in Criminal Justice, 60 GEO. L.J. 249 (1971); Note, Growth of Procedural Due Process
Into a New Substance, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 502 (1971).
2. Although this note primarily deals with the procedural due process rights of state prison-
ers under the fourteenth amendment, the same principles govern the fifth amendment due
process rights of federal prisoners. Braxton v. Carlson, 340 F. Supp. 999, 1001 n.3 (M.D. Pa.
1972), afl'd, 483 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1973).
3. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871):
He [the convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his
liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords
him. He is for the time being the slave of the State. Id. at 796.
4. Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 576
(8th Cir. 1968); Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428, 431 (4th Cir. 1966); Landman v. Royster,
333 F. Supp. 621, 643 (E.D. Va. 1971). Among the rights retained is freedom of speech and
association. Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Freedom of religion has
been included. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Brown
v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971). Access to the courts was guaranteed. Younger v.
Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), aff'g Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); McDonough v.
Director of Patuxent, 429 F.2d 1189 (4th Cir. 1970); Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220 (4th
Cir. 1969); Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966).
Freedom from racial discrimination was upheld in Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968)(per
curiam); Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966). The right to due process of law has
been held applicable to prisoners. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Gray v. Creamer,
465 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1972).
5. FRrTCH, CInV RIGHTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INmTEs 31 (1961)(document prepared for the
Federal Bureau of Prisons) is generally credited as the source of the phrase "hands-off doc-
trine." It declares that courts are "without power to supervise prison administration or to
interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regulations." Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). Cf. Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, 994 (4th Cir.
1966). See generally Hirschkop and Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55
VA. L. REv. 795, 812 (1969); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALm L.J. 506 (1963).
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guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment, or that it ran afoul of
the fourteenth amendment by being arbitrary and capricious.' Alterna-
tively, some federal courts denied due process safeguards in prisons by
using a "right-privilege" distinction to remove actions of prison officials
that might be classified as privileges rather than rights from judicial scru-
tiny.7
In 1969 the Supreme Court announced that prison regulations conflict-
ing with inmates' constitutional rights may be invalidated,8 but did not
specify which procedural safeguards were applicable. In this void of sub-
stantive guidance, it is no surprise that courts enumerated a wide variety
of procedural requirements when faced with prisoners' complaints of lack
of due process in disciplinary proceedings.
6. Therianult v. Blackwell, 437 F.2d 76, 77 (5th Cir. 1971) (prison official's discretion in
cancelling good time credit is upheld absent a showing that officials acted arbitrarily, capri-
ciously, or fraudulently); Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968)(placing
prisoner in maximum security is upheld since there is no proof that such action was arbitrary
or capricious).
7. The first application of this distinction with respect to prisoners was in Ughbanks v.
Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908), where the granting of parole was characterized as a mere
matter of sovereign grace. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492
(1935) is often quoted:
... [W]e do not accept the petitioner's contention that the privilege [probation
revocation hearing] has a basis in the Constitution apart from any statute. Probation
or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and
may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose.
The "right-privilege" distinction was laid to rest in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972). See generally Comment, Procedural Due Process for Intraprison Disciplinary Hear-
ings: An Arkansas Analysis, 27 ARK. L. REv. 44, 47-49 (1973).
8. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969). The Court stated:
There is no doubt that discipline and administration of state detention facilities are
state functions. They are subject to federal authority only where paramount federal
constitutional or statutory rights supervene. It is clear, however, that in instances
where state regulations applicable to inmates of prison facilities conflict with such
rights, the regulations may be invalidated.
9. Perhaps the first case to list required safeguards was Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F. Supp. 1
(D. Mass. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970). Although the holdings
are too varied to categorize meaningfully, the consensus seems to be that only the bare
"essentials" of due process were required-notice, opportunity to be heard, decision by a fair
hearing body; while the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and counsel representa-
tion were generally denied. See Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972);
Lathrop v. Brewer, 340 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971); Bundy v.
Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass.
1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F.
Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub nor.; Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1094, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
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In Morrissey v. Brewer," the Burger Court applied its familiar balancing
technique" to a parole revocation situation and held that parolees are
entitled to: a written notice of claimed violations; disclosure of damaging
evidence; an opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses and docu-
mentary evidence; the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allow-
ing confrontation; a "neutral and detached" hearing body; and a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole.1 2 Morrissey did not reach the issue of retained or ap-
pointed counsel. Gagnon v. Scarpelli,3 following quickly, involved a pro-
ceeding for probation revocation without deferred sentencing. The Court
held the matter of counsel to be within the discretion of prison officials on
a case by case basis'4 but required grounds for refusal to be succinctly
stated in the record.'5
The federal courts now had standards for some post-conviction proceed-
ings, but not specifically for in-prison disciplinary proceedings. It became
necessary to consider whether the differences between the individual's and
state's interests in parole/probation-revocation proceedings and prison dis-
ciplinary proceedings were sufficient to warrant altering these standards.'"
In Wolff v. McDonnell,7 the Supreme Court was provided with an oppor-
10. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
11. The "balancing test" considers first whether the nature of the individual's interest is
within the contemplation of the "liberty or property" language of the fourteenth amendment.
Then there is an inspection of the precise nature of the interests at stake. In Morrissey, the
individual's interest was retention of freedom; the state's interest was avoiding administra-
tive burdens and the concomitant costs in time and money.
12. 408 U.S. at 489.
13. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
14. The Court's holding was reminiscent of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The Court
said in Scarpelli that "the need for counsel at revocation hearings derives, not from the
invariable attributes of those hearings, but rather from the peculiarities of particular cases."
411 U.S. at 789.
15. Id. at 791.
16. The courts were even more varied than before in their holdings. Some courts required
only the bare minimal safeguards. See note 9 supra. Others adopted the Morrisey-Scarpelli
standards, while still others required the unqualified rights of confrontation, cross-
examination, and counsel or counsel-substitute representation. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Procu-
nier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1974); Palmigi-
ano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973); Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1973);
United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973); Clements v. Turner,
364 F. Supp. 270 (D. Utah 1973); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973);
Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Stewart v. Jozwiak, 346 F. Supp. 1062
(E.D. Wis. 1972); Workman v. Kleindienst, 2 Prison L. Rptr. (W.D. Wash. July 20, 1973).
17. 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974).
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tunity to specify due process requirements for actions taken by prison
officials. McDonnell, an inmate, filed a class action complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,11 alleging loss of liberty in the form of revoked good time
credits 9 and placement in solitary or primitive segregation without due
process of law. 2 The procedures alleged to be inadequate consisted of a
conference between convict, charging party, and supervisor, where convict
is advised of the charge, and a hearing before the Adjustment Committee,
where the report from the conference is read and the convict may question
the charging party.2'
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
19. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,107 (Supp. 1972) provided for the allowance of good time as
follows:
(1) The chief executive officer of a facility shall reduce, for parole purposes, for
good behavior and faithful performance of duties while confined in a facility the term
of a committed offender sentenced as follows: Two months on the first year, two
months on the second year, three months on the third year, four months of each
succeeding year of his term and pro rata for any part thereof which is less than a year.
In addition, for especially meritorious behavior or exceptional performance of his du-
ties, an offender may receive a further reduction, not to exceed five days, for any month
of imprisonment. The total of all such reductions shall be deducted:
(a) From his minimum term, to determine the date of his eligibility for release on
parole; and
(b) From his maximum term, to determine the date when his release under super-
vision becomes mandatory ....
(2) Reductions of such terms may be forfeited, withheld and restored by the chief
executive officer of the facility after the offender has been consulted regarding the
charges of misconduct ...
Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161, 4165 (1970); VA. CODE ALNN. §§ 53-213 to -214 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
20. McDonnell also challenged the prison's procedures for opening mail from attorneys and
making available adequate legal assistance for civil rights actions and habeas writs. The relief
sought was in the form of damages, restoration of good time, and a declaratory judgment with
respect to procedures for imposing loss of good time. The Court held that under Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), restoration of good time could only be sought by writ of
habeas corpus, with the concomitant requirement of exhausting state remedies; however,
damage claims as well as suits challenging the conditions of confinement rather than the fact
or length of custody could be pressed under § 1983. 94 S. Ct. at 2973-74.
21. The district court found the following procedures in effect when an inmate is charged
with a prison violation:
(a) The chief correction supervisor reviews the "write-ups" on the inmates by the
officers of the Complex daily;




Justice White, writing for the majority, used the two-pronged balancing
technique.2 2 While finding the loss of good time credits encompassed
within the concept of "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment,2
he stressed that the resulting right to due process protection may be sub-
ject to restrictions "imposed by the nature of the regime to which [the
inmate] has been lawfully committed."24 Therefore, the interests of the
state must be balanced against those of the individual to determine the
extent that procedural safeguards should apply inside the prison.
The inmate faced with loss of good time or solitary confinement is found
to be less prejudiced than the individual faced with revocation of parole
or probation, because he will not suffer immediate change in the conditions
of his liberty. His deprivation, if not restored, may extend the maximum
term to be served, but this extension may have no effect on the actual date
of parole." On the other hand, the state's interest is deemed greater in the
setting of the prison than in revocation of parole and probation proceed-
ings. The prison officials have the need to maintain a closed and tightly
controlled environment to cope with the tension, frustrations, resentment,
and despair of everyday prison life.26
Because of these different interests, the Court found only two of the
Morrissey safeguards fully applicable in prison disciplinary proceedings.
The inmate must be given at least twenty-four hours advance written
notice of the claimed violation and a written record of the fact-findings "as
(c) following the conference, a conduct report is sent to the Adjustment Commit-
tee;
(d) there follows a hearing before the Adjustment Committee and the report is read
to the inmate and discussed;
(e) if the inmate denies the charge he may ask questions of the party writing him
up;
(f) the Adjustment Committee can conduct additional investigations if it desires;
(g) punishment is imposed.
94 S. Ct. at 2973.
22. See note 11 supra.
23. 94 S. Ct. at 2975. The Court states:
.. [The State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its
deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner's interest has
real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment "liberty"
to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and
required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not
arbitrarily abrogated.
24. Id. See also Parker v. Levy, 94 S. Ct. 2547 (1974); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n
v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972).
25. 94 S. Ct. at 2977.
26. Id. at 2977-78.
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to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action
taken." 1 The right to call witnesses is left to the discretion of prison offi-
cials. 28 Confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses is re-
jected,2 19 as is the right to counsel." Finally,' without specifying a standard,
the Court refused to find the Adjustments Committee not sufficiently im-
partial to violate the due process clause requirements.
2
The Court's holding that "the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings
should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in
his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to
27. Id. at 2978.
28. Id. at 2979-80.
29. Confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses are deemed to have too
much "potential for havoc inside the prison walls. Proceedings would inevitably be longer and
tend to unmanageability." Id. at 2980. Danger of reprisal against informants and resentment
towards guards create the "potential for havoc" according to the Court. Id. at 2981. Note that
Nebraska's procedure allowed a form of confrontation or cross-examination by the prisoner.
See note 21 supra.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas record a strong dissent on this issue, backed by
cited authority that is lacking in the majority opinion. They contend that the purpose of
notice and a hearing, to allow the accused to prepare and present a defense, is defeated where
confrontation and cross-examination are disallowed. Id. at 2987-91, 2994-95. These rights
have been required when decisions turn on questions of fact. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
269 (1970). This is invariably the case in prison disciplinary proceedings. Landman v. Roys-
ter, 333 F. Supp. 621, 653 (E.D. Va. 1971). See Davis v. Alaska, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1974);
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959). See generally Comment, Procedural Due Process
in the Involuntary Institutional Transfer of Prisoners, 60 VA. L. REv. 333, 355-57 (1974).
30. The Court's reasons include financial cost, prolongation of process, and reduction of
the proceeding's utility as a means to further correctional goals. 94 S. Ct. at 2981. Justices
Marshall and Brennan weakly dissent, contending that when an inmate is unable to ade-
quately present a defense, at least counsel-substitute (usually a law student or better quali-
fied inmate) should be provided. Id. at 2992. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-87
(1973); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621,
654 (E.D. Va. 1971).
31. Other tangential issues were resolved. The Court held that due process requirements
are not to be applied retroactively to expunge prison records; that a requirement that mail
from attorneys to prisoners be opened in the presence of inmates, without being read by prison
officials, does not infringe prisoners' first, sixth, and fourteenth amendment rights; and that
the capacity of the inmate advisor be assessed in light of the demand for assistance in civil
rights actions as well as in the preparation of habeas writs. 94 S. Ct. at 2983-86.
32. Id. at 2982. Some courts have suggested standards. See, e.g., Sands v. Wainwright, 357
F. Supp. 1062, 1084 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 784 (N.D.
Cal. 1971) (disqualified anyone who reported, was involved in, or was a witness to a rule
infraction, or who was supposed to review a decision of the disciplinary committee). See
Colligan v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1233, 1237 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (disqualified superior
or subordinate to anyone bringing charges). See generally Comment, supra n. 29 at 360.
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institutional safety or correctional goals"' leaves his right unenforceable."
Prison officials are not even required to state their reasons for refusing a
prisoner his right to call a witness." This lack of accountability means that
a hearing may serve as a cloak to arbitrary and capricious action.
By denying the prisoner the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, the Court leaves him at the mercy of "individuals whose mem-
ory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated
by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. . . ."I' The
dissenters would hold these rights applicable to inmates, unless "the hear-
ing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation.""7
While consistent with previous authority, this solution would seem to an-
swer the Court's objections to these rights." Likewise, consideration of
whether or not counsel may be present, on a case by case basis, adds little
to the administrative burden but adds much to the fairness of a hearing.
Arguably, the Court's rationale is untenable. The balancing process
overlooks some important considerations. As for the individual, his interest
in the limited liberty left to him is perhaps the more substantial. 9 At any
rate, the Court fails to cite any authority holding that due process is more
applicable where the threat is of immediate loss of liberty. In assessing
state interests, the Court failed to consider the possible rehabilitative ef-
fects that might result from the appearance of fairness."
33. 94 S. Ct. at 2979.
34. The opportunity to be heard includes the right to present evidence. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970). But in McDonnell the Court allows the former while denying the
latter.
35. 94 S. Ct. at 2979-80.
36. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959). The Court continues:
... This Court has been zealous to protect these rights [confrontation and cross-
examination] from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases. . . but also
in all types of cases where administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny.
In Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 653 (E.D. Va. 1971), Judge Merhige states:
"Because most disciplinary cases will turn on issues of fact . the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses is essential."
37. 94 S. Ct. at 2994, citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
38. See note 29 supra.
39. 94 S. Ct. at 2993 (Justice Douglas dissenting). Prisoners are sometimes placed in
solitary or punitive segregation for months or even years. See Bryant v. Harris, 465 F.2d 365
(7th Cir. 1972); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Adams v. Carlson, 368 F.
Supp. 1050 (E.D. Ill. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
40. Forced dependence on administrative decisions helps create intense hostility and the
type of environment where security is tenuous at best. G. SYKES, THE SocWrY oF CAPTIVES
73-75 (1958). On the other hand, ". . .fair treatment ... will enhance the chance of rehabili-
tation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
Accord, Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 653 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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Especially disturbing is the Court's failure to recognize that the objec-
tions to providing wholesale due process rights, due to the different inter-
ests, are met in the Morrissey approach of allowing denial of the rights but
providing for some accountability. The task of running a prison is not an
easy one, and the Court is correct to take cognizance of possible security
risks and administrative burdens. Yet it is precisely the unchecked power
of prison administrators which is the problem that due process safeguards
are required to cure.4'
W.J.L
See Rabinowitz, The Expression of Prisoners' Rights, 16 VIL. L. REv. 1047 (1971), in which
it is noted that treating prisoners like animals makes attempts at rehabilitation ludicrous and
makes prisons good only for punishment and quarantine. See generally F. COHN, TE LEGAL
CHALLENGE TO CORRECTIONS 65 (1969); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 13, 82-83 (1967).
41. Id. See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969), wherein the Court states:
"Not only the principle of judicial review, but the whole scheme of American government,
reflects an institutionalized mistrust of any such unchecked and unbalanced power over
essential liberties." Id. at 621.
See generally Paulsen, Prison Reform in the Future-The Trend Toward Expansion of
Prisoner's Rights, 2 PRISONER'S RIGHTS 449 (M. Haft & M. Hermann, PLI, 1972).
For a comprehensive study of all aspects of prisoners' rights, including history and future
trends in reform and remedies, see M. HERMANN & M. HAFT, PRIsoNERs' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK
(1973).
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